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I. INTRODUCTION
The City of Jerusalem holds a special place in world heritage. It is
home to fundamentally sacred sites for three of the largest religions in
the world1 and has been center-stage for multiple religious crusades.2
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Michael Blackburn, J.D., University of Nebraska College of Law 2017. For my
father.
1. COLUMBIA UNIV. PRESS, THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 1407 (Barbara A. Chernow
& George A. Vallasi eds., 5th ed. 1993) (“Jerusalem is a holy city for Jews, Chris-
tians, and Muslims.”). Jerusalem is home to the Dome of the Rock, the second
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From the Canaanites and Romans, to the Ottomans, to Hamas and
the Israelis today, the battle for its possession has spanned millen-
nia.3 That struggle for control has also entangled U.S. foreign policy
since the birth of modern Israel in 1948.4 After almost seven decades,
a solution continues to elude the country’s policy makers.5
Under our Constitution, the Judicial Branch does not play a direct
role in deciding U.S. foreign policy regarding Jerusalem, leaving that
task to the Executive and Legislative Branches instead.6 However, in
2015, Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry7 presented the Court with a
conflict between those branches over control of that policy. The dis-
pute was the result of a long battle stemming from section 214(d) of
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003.8 This sec-
tion allowed American citizens born in Jerusalem to choose to have
their passport list Israel as their place of birth.9
Section 214(d) directly contradicted the Executive Branch’s stance
on the status of Jerusalem, which has consistently been a refusal to
acknowledge any country’s sovereignty over the city since the creation
of Israel in 1948.10 On the same day the President signed it into law,
he also issued a statement clarifying the American diplomatic position
on sovereignty over Jerusalem had not changed.11 The statement also
claimed if section 214(d) was interpreted as mandatory, it would un-
constitutionally interfere with the Executive Branch’s authority over
foreign affairs.12 The policy conflict caused by section 214(d) was ag-
gravated by the Executive Branch’s Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM),
most holy site in Islam; the Wailing Wall, the only standing wall from Solomon’s
Temple and holy place for Jews; and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, a Chris-
tian church built in 1086 AD. Id.
2. Id. at 1407–08.
3. Id.
4. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2081 (2015).
5. Id. Notably, President Trump has projected a large change in U.S. foreign policy
regarding Israel, proving once again this is by no means a settled issue. Nicole
Gaouette & Elise Labott, Trump Backs Off Two-State Framework for Is-
raeli–Palestinian Deal, CNN (Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/15/poli
tics/trump-netanyahu-two-state-solution-israel-palestinians [https://perma.unl
.edu/2A9G-86ZK].
6. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2081 (“In our constitutional system these matters are
committed to the Legislature and the Executive, not the Judiciary.”).
7. 135 S. Ct. 2076.
8. Id. at 2082 (“The subsection that lies at the heart of this case, § 214(d), addresses
passports”).
9. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, 116
Stat. 1350 (2002).
10. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2082 (“[N]either President Truman nor any later United
States President has issued an official statement or declaration acknowledging
any country’s sovereignty over Jerusalem.”).
11. Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003,
2 PUB. PAPERS 1698 (Sept. 30, 2002).
12. Id.
200 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:198
which defines the State Department’s guidelines on listing place of
birth on U.S. passports.13 The FAM prohibits the issuance of pass-
ports that list a place of birth that contradicts “Executive Branch pol-
icy.”14 This policy clash set the stage in Zivotofsky for a rare foreign-
affairs separation-of-powers dispute between the Legislative and Ex-
ecutive Branches.
This Note argues the Zivotofsky Court erred by applying a lower
standard than it previously relied on when assessing the constitu-
tional division of the Executive Branch’s foreign-affairs powers rela-
tive to the Legislative Branch. The Court’s error was exacerbated by
the functionalist persuasion the Court relied on in order to reach its
verdict. The result of this wayward step was to upend the established
precedent, making predictions of future case outcomes useless, while
simultaneously expanding the power of the Executive Branch.
Part II of this Note will provide an overview of the relevant case
law on the separation of powers in foreign-affairs cases. It will also
discuss the winding procedural path Zivotofsky took over the span of
more than a decade before finally being decided on the merits by the
Supreme Court. Part III compares the standards applied in the
Zivotofsky ruling with the standards previously applied under the
Jackson Concurrence in foreign-affairs separation-of-powers questions
and the rejection of functionalism in those previous decisions. Finally,
Part III forecasts some of the possible outcomes of the Zivotofsky deci-
sion, and Part IV concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of the Relevant Case Law
An analysis of the balance of power between the two political
branches in foreign affairs relies heavily on case law. This is because
the Constitution is largely silent or vague on many subjects dealing
with foreign affairs.15 Complicating this further is the wide berth the
Court has traditionally given the political branches in dealing with
such issues because of its exceptionalist approach to foreign affairs.16
While a debate over the depth or merits of this approach is beyond the
13. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2082.
14. Id.
15. Stephen I. Vladeck, Foreign Affairs Originalism in Youngstown’s Shadow, 53 ST.
LOUIS L.J. 29, 35 (2008).
16. See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1907–08 (2015) (“We therefore define foreign rela-
tions exceptionalism to mean that domestic and foreign affairs-related issues are
analyzed in distinct ways as a matter of function, doctrine, or methodology.”).
Although foreign affairs exceptionalism was not always the doctrinal preference
of the Court, it has been for the last century. Id. at 1911.
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scope of this Note,17 it is important to note the result of that approach
is a void of rulings in this area of law.18 This exceptionalist approach
also separates foreign-affairs cases from other separation-of-powers
cases because the Court has used a deferential standard to decide for-
eign-affairs questions in the few cases it has actually heard.19 The cor-
nerstone case in this area is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.20 With Youngstown as its foundation, the Court has built a
cannon of case law by adding decisions in Dames & Moore v. Regan,21
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,22 and finally Medellı́n v. Texas.23
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
The Youngstown decision came during a shift in American history
as the country was engaged in a new war in Korea.24 Under the prolif-
erating specter of the Cold War, President Truman was faced with a
strike by the entire steel industry while he was trying to rearm the
military for action in Korea.25 President Truman, relying on his pow-
ers as Commander in Chief, moved to nationalize the steel industry
after collective bargaining broke down in order to keep steel produc-
tion going.26 The executive action was objected to by the industry and
wound up before the Court in 1952.27
Youngstown foreshadowed tangled decisions to come. It was a 6–3
decision with five concurring opinions holding President Truman’s ac-
tions were not within the Executive Branch’s powers and were there-
fore unconstitutional.28 The most well-known part of the Youngstown
decision is the now familiar concurrence written by Justice Jackson,
known colloquially as the “Jackson Concurrence.” In his concurrence,
17. The debate over foreign affairs exceptionalism and the debate over using formal-
ist versus functionalist approaches to foreign-affairs cases are often intertwined,
and therefore, arguments made in one debate are frequently applicable to the
other. See id. at 1908. Several such arguments are identifiable in the myriad of
opinions in the cases discussed infra in Part II. The merits of those arguments
are argued sufficiently in the different opinions of those cases and are not neces-
sary to the arguments made in this Note.
18. Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 16, at 1917–18 (“Courts applied the political
question doctrine to limit the justiciability of foreign relations claims and thereby
preserve the political branches’ ability to shape foreign policy.”).
19. Id. at 1900 (“[W]ithin the federal political branches, [exceptionalism] meant that
the executive branch had expansive authority and received considerable
deference.”).
20. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
21. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
22. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
23. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
24. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 668 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 582–83 (majority opinion).
26. Id. at 583.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 589.
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Justice Jackson formulated a tripartite analytical scheme to explain
and evaluate the ebb and flow of powers between the two political
branches.29 The three parts of his scheme were:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses
in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. . . . [Executive Action]
pursuant to an Act of Congress [is] supported by the strongest of presump-
tions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation . . . .
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or de-
nial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there
is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority,
or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, in-
difference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable,
if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. . . .
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential con-
trol . . . only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presiden-
tial claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized
with caution . . . .30
This analytical scheme is the foundation for analysis of separation-of-
powers questions in foreign-affairs cases.31 It sets out the Executive
Branch’s sources of power and the judicial standard that should be
used to evaluate the constitutionality of the Executive’s actions. Using
this framework, Justice Jackson concluded the President’s actions fell
into the third category and that the President did not have the power
to nationalize the steel industry.32
2. Dames & Moore v. Regan
More than thirty years after Youngstown, the Court formally
adopted the Jackson Concurrence for the first time in Dames & Moore
v. Regan.33 This time the Court was asked to decide the constitution-
ality of two Executive Orders issued by President Carter.34 In re-
sponse to the capture of the American embassy in Tehran—resulting
in several Americans being held hostage—the President moved to
freeze all of the assets of the Iranian government.35 The petitioner,
Dames & Moore, filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California against the Government of Iran and a
29. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctu-
ate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”).
30. Id. at 635–38.
31. Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 16, at 1952.
32. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 660 (Jackson, J., concurring).
33. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
34. Id. at 665.
35. Id.
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third party whom it claimed owed over three million dollars in com-
pensation under a contract for services already performed.36
The district court ruled in favor of Dames & Moore. However, the
President issued an Executive Order implementing terms of an agree-
ment between Iran and the United States to settle all disputes be-
tween any parties from the two countries before a specified tribunal.37
The President subsequently issued another Executive Order referring
any claims already in United States courts to the tribunal, and the
district court suspended petitioner’s claim accordingly.38 The Presi-
dent relied on the Executive Branch’s power to settle claims between
the United States and foreign governments to issue the orders.39
Dames & Moore moved for an injunction against both, claiming the
Executive Orders were unconstitutional. Ultimately, the case was
heard before the United States Supreme Court on appeal in 1981.40
The Court issued a unanimous decision41 upholding the Presi-
dent’s authority to issue both Executive Orders.42 In its decision, the
Court explicitly relied on the framework of the Jackson Concurrence
to analyze the President’s power.43 It held the first Executive Order
was authorized explicitly by Congress, falling into the first tier of the
Jackson Concurrence framework, and was therefore within the Presi-
dent’s power.44 The Court found the second Executive Order was im-
plicitly consented to by Congress, putting it into the second tier of the
Jackson Concurrence, and thus, also within the President’s power.45
3. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
Following its decision in Dames & Moore, the Court next heard a
foreign-affairs separation-of-powers case twenty-five years later in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.46 The Hamdan Court was faced with a chal-
lenge to an expansion of power by the Executive Branch during the
course of the “War on Terror.” The United States had detained and
begun to try suspected terrorists captured in its collateral military ac-
tion in Afghanistan.47 The petitioner in Hamdan was one of these sus-
36. Id. at 663–64.
37. Id. at 664–65.
38. Id. at 666.
39. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
40. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 667–68.
41. The ruling in Dames & Moore was unanimous, but there were two concurrences
which both focused on a separate legal issue addressed at the end of the majority
opinion unrelated to the Jackson Concurrence. Id. at 690 (Stevens & Powell, JJ.,
concurring).
42. Id. at 690 (majority opinion).
43. Id. at 668.
44. Id. at 674.
45. Id. at 688.
46. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
47. Id. at 566.
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pected terrorists and was held at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba.48 The Executive Branch chose to try some of the detainees,
including the petitioner, in military commissions instead of regular
courts-martial. Relying on his power as Commander in Chief, the
President established procedures for the commissions that varied sig-
nificantly from courts-martial and other standard judicial actions, and
began to carry them out.49 The petitioner objected to those procedures
on constitutional grounds, arguing they were illegal under both the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and Geneva Convention.50
Like Youngstown, the ruling in Hamdan was fractured to the point
of being chaotic, with two concurrences and two dissents joined by dif-
ferent combinations of Justices.51 The majority decided the military
commissions did not comply with procedures required by laws Con-
gress passed to establish the Uniform Code of Military Justice and to
implement the Geneva Convention and were therefore unconstitu-
tional.52 Unlike the other foreign-affairs cases, the majority in
Hamdan did not engage in a thorough Jackson Concurrence analysis
to answer the question, opting instead to rely on statutory interpreta-
tion.53 However, the majority’s decision had the implied effect of put-
ting the analysis into the third tier of the Jackson Concurrence
because the Court was deciding if the Executive Branch could conduct
the military commissions where Congress had passed prohibiting leg-
islation. This understanding is bolstered by the majority’s citation to
Youngstown in a footnote. It explained that any independent power
the President may have to convene military commissions is still bound
by Congress’s exercise of its constitutionally granted powers in the
same area.54
48. Id. at 568.
49. Id. at 591–93.
50. Id. at 567. The Court was also asked to answer a question about whether it had
jurisdiction over the case, but that constitutional question is not relevant to the
discussion in this Note. Id.
51. Id. at 564 (“STEVENS, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I through IV, VI through VI–D–iii,
VI–D–v, and VII, in which KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER,
JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts V and VI–D–iv, in which SOU-
TER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a concurring
opinion, in which KENNEDY, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined . . . . KEN-
NEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, in which SOUTER, GINSBURG,
and BREYER, JJ., joined as to Parts I and II . . . . SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined . . . . THOMAS, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined, and in which ALITO, J., joined
as to all but Parts I, II–C–1, and III–B–2 . . . . ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opin-
ion, in which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined as to Parts I through III . . . .
ROBERTS, C. J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.”).
52. Id. at 635.
53. Id. at 613.
54. Id. at 593 n.23.
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Additionally, the majority’s analysis is strengthened by Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsberg, and Breyer from the majority. Justice Kennedy’s analysis
explicitly undertook the standard Jackson Concurrence analysis and
put the Executive Branch’s actions into the third tier.55 This is juxta-
posed with Justice Thomas’s dissent, which placed the question
squarely in the first tier of the Jackson Concurrence.56 Thus, despite
the different levels of reliance on the application of the Jackson Con-
currence, an analysis of the opinions in Hamdan is valuable as part of
the case law regarding foreign-affairs separation-of-powers questions
because they both used the same analytical framework despite the dif-
ferent outcomes.
4. Medellı́n v. Texas
The final case in this canon is Medellı́n v. Texas.57 In Medellı́n, the
petitioner, José Medellı́n, was a Mexican national convicted of murder
and sentenced to death in Texas.58 He filed a habeas corpus petition
on the grounds that he had not been advised of his right to consular
assistance from the Mexican consulate after his arrest.59 While the
application was pending, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is-
sued a decision60 concluding the United States had violated its treaty
obligations by not informing several Mexican nationals, including Me-
dellı́n, of their consular rights.61 The ICJ ruling concluded the United
States was accordingly obligated to review the conviction.62
The Fifth Circuit declined to follow the ICJ ruling and did not issue
a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but
before it heard the case, President Bush issued a Memorandum at-
tempting to enforce the ICJ ruling.63 Medellı́n then filed a second
habeas application in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, this time
based on the President’s Memorandum, to have the ICJ ruling en-
forced to review his death sentence.64 The Supreme Court dismissed
55. Id. at 639 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 680 (Thomas, J., concurring).
57. Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
58. Id. at 500–01.
59. Id. at 501.
60. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.
Rep. 12 (Mar. 31).
61. Id.; see Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Dis-
putes art. 36(1)(b), Apr. 24, 1963, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 (“If he so
requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay,
inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a
national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending
trial or is detained in any other manner.”).
62. Medellı́n, 552 U.S. at 502–03.
63. Id. at 503.
64. Id.
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the first grant of certiorari to allow the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals hear the issue.65 However, the Texas Court of Appeals refused to
issue a writ of habeas corpus, so the Supreme Court again granted
certiorari.66
The President maintained he could implement the ICJ ruling
based on his Memorandum.67 He argued it could enforce the treaty
obligating the United States to enforce ICJ rulings as domestic law.68
However, the Court found the treaty was nonself-executing and thus
had to be implemented via legislation in order to take effect as domes-
tic law.69 It weighed the President’s claim of unilateral power to im-
plement the treaty against Congress’s power to pass implementation
laws and found them to be incongruent.70 This conclusion put the case
in the third tier of the Jackson Concurrence.71 The Court then found
that the Executive Branch did not have any exclusive power derived
from the Constitution that would allow the President to unilaterally
implement a treaty, and therefore his Memorandum could not do so.72
B. The Procedural History of Zivotofsky
The clash over section 214(d) arose in 2002—the same year it was
adopted—with the birth of petitioner Menachem Binyamin Zivotof-
sky.73 Zivotofsky was born to two American citizens in Jerusalem.74
His mother visited the United States Embassy to request a passport
and consular report of birth for him, and requested his place of birth
on both read “Jerusalem, Israel.”75 The consulate refused based on
FAM policy.76 Zivotofsky’s parents subsequently brought suit on his
behalf in in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia for relief under section 214 against the Secretary of State in
2003.77
After the initial suit was filed, the subsequent legal battle spanned
over a decade and involved multiple iterations. The district court ini-
tially dismissed the case because it did not believe Zivotofsky had
65. Id.
66. Id. at 504.
67. Id. at 525.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 527.
72. Id. at 530–32.
73. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083 (2015).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 2004 WL 5835212, at *2 (D.D.C.
Sept. 7, 2004).
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standing and because it was a nonjusticiable political question.78 On
appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court found there was stand-
ing and remanded the case for the district court to complete the record
and reach a decision as to whether the case was justiciable or not.79
During that appeal, both parties also agreed the proper question in
the case was whether Zivotofsky could be issued a passport listing his
place of birth as “Israel” instead of “Jerusalem, Israel,” as the original
complaint contended.
The district court again took up the case on remand in 2007. Both
parties filed for summary judgment, and the Secretary of State also
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
district court found they were faced with a nonjusticiable question
under the standard in Baker v. Carr80 and dismissed without ruling
on the merits of either motion for summary judgment.81 Zivotofsky
again appealed, and the District of Columbia Circuit Court affirmed in
2009.82 Zivotofsky then appealed the court of appeal’s ruling, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2011.83
The Supreme Court heard the case in 2012 and reversed the deci-
sion in an 8–1 ruling, with separate concurrences written by Justice
Sotomayor and Justice Alito, and a dissent by Justice Breyer.84 Chief
Justice Robert’s majority opinion responded that the question
presented was the interpretation of a statute and its constitutionality,
78. Zivotofsky ex rel. Ari Z. v. Sec’y of State, 444 F.3d 614, 615 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
79. Id. at 620.
80. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Baker has six elements, any of which being met would create
a nonjusticiable political question:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of de-
ciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonju-
dicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coor-
dinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart-
ments on one question.
Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The district court
found that the first, second, fourth, and sixth Baker elements were all met in the
Zivotofsky case, and therefore, it was a political question that was not justiciable.
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97, 102–06 (D.D.C.
2007).
81. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97, 107 (D.D.C.
2007).
82. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding the
court did not have jurisdiction over the political question and therefore could not
rule on the merits).
83. M.B.Z. ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 563 U.S. 973 (2011).
84. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012).
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and that question was within the scope of the courts’ ability.85 The
case was remanded back down to the district court to be decided on
the merits.86
The District of Columbia Circuit Court reviewed the case for a
third time in 2013, a decade after section 214(d) was adopted and the
original suit brought.87 It ruled the President has sole recognition
power and section 214(d) was an unconstitutional breach of that
power.88 Zivotofsky appealed this judgment and was again granted
certiorari in 2014.89
The Court sustained the circuit court’s ruling in another frag-
mented 6–3 ruling with two concurrences and two dissents.90 The ma-
jority opinion focused on two questions. First, after deciding the
executive action in question fell into the third category of the Jackson
Concurrence,91 it asked whether the Executive Branch’s recognition
power is “exclusive and conclusive.”92 Second, after determining
whether the recognition power was exclusive and conclusive, it had to
decide whether section 214(d) unconstitutionally encroached on the
Executive’s exclusive and conclusive recognition power.93 Both of
these questions were answered in the affirmative.94
Justice Breyer concurred, but wrote separately to reiterate his
opinion that the case presented an issue which was a nonjusticiable
political question.95 Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment in part
and dissented in part.96 He found the Executive Branch has “residual
foreign affairs powers” not set out explicitly in the Constitution.97 He
argued section 214(d) conflicts with those powers and Congress has no
constitutional power in that area to interfere.98 Justice Thomas con-
cluded his concurrence by explicitly dissenting from the majority that
the case at bar involved the recognition power,99 but concurred in the
judgment regardless, having already found section 214(d) to be uncon-
stitutional for other reasons previously discussed.100
85. Id. at 195–96.
86. Id. at 202.
87. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
88. Id. at 225.
89. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 134 S. Ct. 1873 (2014).
90. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
91. Id. at 2083. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
92. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084.
93. Id. at 2094.
94. Id. at 2096.
95. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
96. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 2099.
98. Id. at 2101.
99. Id. at 2112.
100. Id. at 2113.
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Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, wrote the first dis-
sent,101 and both justices joined Justice Scalia’s dissent as well. The
Chief Justice wrote a separate opinion to highlight what he thought
was an “unprecedented” error.102 Like the majority, he framed the dis-
cussion using the Jackson Concurrence.103 However, he found the Ex-
ecutive Branch did not have “exclusive and preclusive” recognition
power104 and fundamentally disagreed that section 214(d) conflicted
with that recognition power at all.105 Justice Scalia wrote the second
dissent, which was much more in-depth and similarly concluded the
Executive Branch did not have exclusive recognition power. Scalia fur-
ther concluded that even if it did, section 214(d) did not conflict with
the recognition power anyway.106
III. ANALYSIS
Zivotofsky is inconsistent with the previous foreign-affairs separa-
tion-of-power cases in two ways. The first is its reliance on an incon-
sistent, lower standard of constitutionally derived exclusive power in
the third tier of the Jackson Concurrence than was used in previous
decisions. The second is the Court’s heavy reliance on functionalism to
plug the gaps in its porous analysis. The sum of these two flaws is a
substantial increase in the Executive Branch’s power and a bewilder-
ing about-face in logic that makes predicting future cases futile.
A. The Third Tier of the Jackson Concurrence Standard
Gets Lowered
To rule in favor of the Executive Branch, the Zivotofsky Court had
to find the Executive’s recognition power to be “exclusive and conclu-
sive” because it fell into the third category of the Jackson Concur-
rence.107 As mentioned supra Part II, Chief Justice Robert’s dissent,
Justice Scalia’s dissent, and Justice Thomas’s concurrence all dis-
agreed whether the recognition power was even implicated. This Note
assumes arguendo that the majority’s contention that the recognition
power was the correct issue to analyze was accurate. In making its
decision, the Court needed to assess three sources: (1) the text of the
Constitution, (2) its own precedent, and (3) the past practice of the
101. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2114.
106. Compare id. at 2116–26 (Scalia, J., dissenting), with id. at 2113–16 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
107. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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political branches.108 While the Court discussed each of these sources,
its analysis of the first source was notably discordant with its previous
rulings in Youngstown, Hamdan, and Medellı́n.
To start its flawed analysis, the Zivotofsky Court identified the Ex-
ecutive Branch’s power to receive ambassadors as the foundation for
its recognition power.109 The Court then built on that base by relying
on the treaty power110 and the power to nominate ambassadors.111 It
stated these powers add to the Executive’s recognition power by giving
him command over such decisions, which can be forms of recogni-
tion.112 The Court attempted to justify this move by asserting that
such power was “exclusive” to the Executive Branch because some of
these powers were solely vested in it, while the Legislative Branch
cannot initiate diplomacy with any foreign nation by itself.113 This
contention is particularly confusing because, by the Court’s own ad-
mission, signing treaties or sending an ambassador may be an act of
recognition, but neither of these things may be done solely by the Ex-
ecutive.114 Therefore, two of the three examples the Court used to des-
ignate the recognition power as exclusive to the Executive Branch are
explicitly shared powers, which is incompatible with the Court’s asser-
tion that somehow the President controls them.
The Court continued on to find that past precedent and political
branch practice also supported the exclusivity of the Executive’s recog-
nition power.115 However, had the Court accurately held the division
of constitutional powers does not confer exclusive recognition power
on the Executive Branch, its review of the past case law and practice
by the two political branches would not have mattered.116 Discussion
of its analysis of those two sources is therefore unnecessary in the face
of its error in deciding on the first.
108. Zivotofsy, 135 S. Ct. at 2084. After assessing each of these three elements and
ruling that recognition power was exclusive to the Executive Branch, the Court
then assessed whether the statute in question abridged the Executive’s recogni-
tion power. Id. at 2094.
109. Id. at 2085 (“It is a logical and proper inference, then, that a Clause directing the
President alone to receive ambassadors would be understood to acknowledge his
power to recognize other nations.”).
110. Id. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
111. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
112. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2085 (“In addition to receiving an ambassador, recogni-
tion may occur on ‘the conclusion of a bilateral treaty,’ or the ‘formal initiation of
diplomatic relations,’ including the dispatch of an ambassador.”) (citations
omitted).
113. Id. at 2086.
114. Id. at 2087.
115. Id. at 2090.
116. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (“Past practice does not, by
itself, create power . . . .”).
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The standard to decide whether the Executive Branch has an ex-
clusive constitutional power in Zivotofsky was by comparison much
higher in Youngstown. In Youngstown, the Court dealt with the Presi-
dent’s power as Commander in Chief and the Vesting Clause.117
While Youngstown did not involve a statute that directly contradicted
the Executive Branch’s policy like Zivotofsky, Justice Black’s majority
opinion asserted the Executive Order issued by President Truman
conflicted with the Legislative Branch’s fundamental power to write
laws.118 The Court decided that where the Constitution was explicit
about Congress’s power to legislate, the Court would not give a liberal
interpretation to the President as Commander in Chief to encroach on
that power, let alone find that it was exclusive in the face of congres-
sional action.119
In Justice Jackson’s concurrence, he analyzed the two different
sources of power the Executive Branch based its claim on. The first of
these was the Vesting Clause, which he argued included any executive
power available to the federal government under the law.120 Justice
Jackson characterized this blunt-force grab for power as antithetical
to the separation of powers in general and dismissed it.121 He then
analyzed Congress’s war powers in relation to the President’s power
as the Commander in Chief. Congress’s war powers include the ability
to raise and maintain a military force or call up the militia, whereas
the commander-in-chief power pertains to the functional command of
that military.122 Finding Congress was explicitly granted distinct
powers by the Constitution in this area, Justice Jackson would not
give the Executive Branch a “monopoly” on war powers with which it
could seize a steel plant.123 This analysis is the reverse result of the
recognition power carved out by the majority in Zivotofsky, which re-
lied directly on multiple shared powers to find recognition was exclu-
sive to the Executive Branch.124
The Court’s analysis in Hamdan followed a standard similar to the
one applied in Youngstown. As discussed supra Part II, the majority in
Hamdan did not engage in a full Jackson Concurrence analysis, forgo-
ing an analysis of whether the President had independent powers in
an area Congress had legislated in multiple times.125 The majority
117. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640–41 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
118. Id. at 588–89 (majority opinion).
119. Id. at 587.
120. Id. at 640–41 (Jackson, J., concurring).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 644.
123. Id. at 642–43.
124. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
125. Michael J. Turner, Fade to Black: The Formalization of Jackson’s Youngstown
Taxonomy by Hamdan and Medellı́n, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 665, 681 (2009).
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simply decided Congress acted within its constitutional share of the
war powers by enacting the legislation that created the UCMJ.126 It
further concluded the commission procedures also violated the Geneva
Convention,127 which was implemented by both the President and
Congress as part of their shared treaty power.128
Thus, the Hamdan Court rejected the President’s contrary actions
in an area where Congress had acted within its constitutional powers.
In fact, some scholars view this as the most important outcome of the
Hamdan ruling.129 Again, the Zivotofsky decision took the reverse ap-
proach by relying in part on the treaty power to find the Executive
Branch’s recognition power was exclusive. This is a diametrically op-
posite conclusion from Hamdan’s determination that Congress could
trump presidential power by adopting legislation to implement the
Geneva Convention under the same treaty power.
Finally, the Court also used the higher standard found in Youngs-
town and Hamdan in its decision in Medellı́n. In Medellı́n, the Presi-
dent argued the Executive Branch had the power to directly enforce
an ICJ ruling because the United States was a party to treaties that
created an obligation to comply with such rulings.130 The Court found
this was directly opposed to Congress’s role in the treaty-ratification
process laid out in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution.131 Once
again, the Court discussed the necessity of action by both the Execu-
tive and Legislative Branches in order to implement a nonself-execut-
ing treaty and thereby give it domestic effect.132 The Court spent little
time dismissing the President’s claim to a unilateral power to imple-
ment the treaty. It paused only to state that based on the Constitu-
tion’s separation of powers, it should not be surprising that the
President may not encroach on the Legislative Branch’s role in the
treaty-ratification process.133 This analysis—like the analysis in
Hamdan—is irreconcilable with the Court’s finding in Zivotofsky that
the recognition power is exclusive to the Executive Branch, as sup-
126. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 592 (2006); see also U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 14 (“To make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval forces”).
127. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
128. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 642 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
129. Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Rob-
erts Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380, 418 (2015) (“It is against Congress’s lim-
ited authorization, then, that the President’s commissions must be assessed.”);
Turner, supra note 125, at 680 (“Hamdan reveals a new understanding of Jack-
son’s third category by assuming that when Congress and the President disagree,
Congress prevails.”).
130. Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525 (2008).
131. Id. at 526.
132. Id.
133. Id. 527–28.
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ported by the President’s purported control of the treaty and ambassa-
dor-nomination powers.
B. A Flawed Functionalist Approach
The second flaw in the Court’s ruling in Zivotofsky is its heavy use
of functionalism134 to fill gaps in its porous arguments used to assess
the recognition power. This approach occurred in the face of previous
decisions explicitly rejecting a functionalist approach to foreign-affairs
separation-of-powers questions. In its analysis of each of the three
sources, in order to establish the Executive Branch’s exclusive recog-
nition power, the Court had to rely on such arguments to buttress oth-
erwise indefensible positions in favor of the Executive Branch.
The most conspicuous functionalist argument occurs in the Court’s
discussion of the Constitution. Immediately following its confusing as-
sertion that the recognition power is exclusive because some of the
Executive Branch’s recognition power is exclusive, the Court quickly
followed by saying that “functional considerations” also suggest the
recognition power must be exclusive to the Executive Branch.135 This
was because “the nation must speak with one voice” due to the dire
consequences that come with the recognition of a foreign sovereign.136
The Court concluded that the one voice had to be the Executive
Branch’s because the Legislative Branch does not have the capability
to speak for the nation with a single voice like the Executive.137
The Court treated its analysis of the second source, relevant case
law on recognition powers, in much the same way. The Court acknowl-
edged up front that no case law directly determines the President
holds the recognition power exclusively.138 After a review of some case
law that was not dispositive, the majority again sought to supplement
a weak case in chief with functionalism. It concluded that regardless
of the Court’s unclear precedent, Congress could not force the Presi-
134. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and
Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21,
21–22 (1998) (“Functionalism . . . might be associated with standards or balanc-
ing tests that seek . . . greater flexibility . . . . [It] might be understood as induc-
tion from constitutional policy and practice, with practice typically being
examined over time . . . . [It] emphasiz[es] pragmatic values like adaptability,
efficacy, and justice in law.”).
135. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015).
136. Id. (citation omitted).
137. Id. The Court further argued that the nation must speak with one voice because
the foreign nations being negotiated with must have unequivocal assurances in
their dealings with the United States. Id. See generally David H. Moore, Beyond
One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953, 1044 (2014) (discussing the merits and history
of the “one voice” doctrine in foreign affairs).
138. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2088.
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dent to contradict himself because of the significant legal
consequences.139
Finally, the Court repeated this functionalist framework yet again
in its assessment of the past practice of the political branches. It did
not go into the same depth as the previous two sources but did explic-
itly conclude the sum of the Legislative Branch’s past practice served
“on balance” to acknowledge the importance of the Executive speaking
with once voice.140 This brief functionalist soliloquy in the analysis is
the shortest of the three but shows the Court’s functionalist approach
permeated each of the three steps in deciding whether the recognition
power was exclusive to the Executive Branch.
In contrast to Zivotofsky, the Court conspicuously rejected func-
tionalist concerns in Youngstown, Dames & Moore, Hamdan, and Me-
dellı́n, which were all cases involving similarly dire diplomatic
consequences as in Zivotofsky. In Youngstown, the crux of the govern-
ment’s argument was that it had the “inherent power” to take action
to avert a national catastrophe.141 Justice Black chose not to even ad-
dress those functional claims. Instead he preferred a purely formalist
assessment of whether or not the Constitution or Congress had given
the Executive Branch the power it was relying on.142 Justice Jackson
however, chose to address the functional arguments put forth by the
government, not only as applied in the case at bar but more generally
regarding such an expansion of executive power in the face of a na-
tional emergency.143 He argued it is too easy to let contemporary cir-
cumstances in the form of emergencies overshadow the importance of
the balance of power intentionally set out in the Constitution.144 He
concluded the Court should be the protector of the Constitution in
such situations.145
Despite those arguments, some scholars argue Justice Jackson’s
concurring opinion supports a functionalist approach to assess for-
eign-affairs separation-of-powers cases.146 That assessment fails for
three reasons. The first, and arguably the strongest, is that Justice
Jackson began his analysis by first looking to original intent.147 It was
139. Id. at 2090.
140. Id. at 2094.
141. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952).
142. Id. at 589.
143. Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
144. Id. (“The tendency is strong to emphasize transient results upon policies—such
as wages or stabilization—and lose sight of enduring consequences upon the bal-
anced power structure of our Republic.”).
145. Id. at 655 (“Such [separations of power] may be destined to pass away. But it is
the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.”).
146. Cohen, supra note 129, at 394 (“Functionalism, in contrast, is at the heart of
Justice Jackson’s influential concurrence in Youngstown . . . .”).
147. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634–35 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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only after concluding original intent could not be discerned that Jus-
tice Jackson turned to a different construction.148 If he believed a
functionalist decision was the correct format to begin with, then he
need not have even gone through that initial analysis.
The second reason is the nature of his tripartite scheme itself. In
trying to solidify an analytical framework, Justice Jackson attempted
to create a structure that could be used by the Court in lieu of the kind
of multifactor balancing test usually associated with functionalist ar-
guments.149 Within each of the scheme’s three tiers, the analysis re-
lies solely on the question of the constitutionality of the actions taken
by either branch. Nowhere in his analysis does he attempt to balance
the needs of the branches.
The final factor in favor of a formalist interpretation of the Jackson
Concurrence is the outcome of his opinion. Justice Jackson’s rejection
of the Government’s functionalist arguments came in the face of a
growing conflict with Korea and the Cold War.150 So dire was the situ-
ation that President Truman believed the use of nuclear weapons was
not only a possibility but may in fact have been demanded by a war-
weary American public if the Soviet Union had sent troops into Ko-
rea.151 Yet even with the threat of nuclear war, Justice Jackson still
ruled against a dangerous increase in power for the Executive Branch.
This conclusion was reached despite the protests by the dissent of the
gravity of the situation.152 These three reasons point to a rejection of
functionalism and set the line for future decisions in foreign-affairs
separation-of-powers cases even during times of national emergency.
The Hamdan Court similarly rejected functionalist arguments for
an expansion of executive power. Hamdan, like Youngstown, was de-
cided during a time of international conflict for the United States.153
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks were the worst in U.S. his-
tory, and the resulting conflict in Afghanistan and the “War on Ter-
ror” were far from finished.154 The petitioner was accused of providing
weapons, ammunition, and security to Osama Bin Laden.155 It was in
this context that the government argued the danger presented by ter-
148. Id.
149. Cohen, supra note 129, at 392.
150. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 668 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
151. Roger Dingman, Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War, 13 INT’L SEC. 50,
53–54 (1989).
152. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 668 (Vinson, J., dissenting) (“A world not yet recovered
from the devastation of World War II has been forced to face the threat of another
and more terrifying global conflict.”).
153. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567–68 (2006).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 646 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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rorism was so great it should not have to comply with the rules of
normal courts-martial.156
The majority began its opinion by acknowledging the special place
in American’s minds occupied by the atrocities committed by Bin
Laden and al Qaeda on September 11, 2001.157 However, while it ac-
knowledged the danger presented by terrorism, it refused to bow to
fear and expand the Executive Branch’s power in the face of contrary
laws passed by Congress.158 This rejection of functionalism in the face
of the sizeable threat of international terrorism is also inconsistent
with the Court’s approach in Zivotofsky.
Finally, the Medellı́n Court also rejected the functionalist argu-
ment put forth by the Executive Branch to support its attempt to ex-
pand its powers. The President argued his role in the government
made him specially qualified to make the foreign-affairs decision that
compliance with the ICJ ruling demanded.159 He claimed the need to
vindicate the United States’ interest in upholding international law
and the Vienna Convention justified his ability to unilaterally imple-
ment a non-self-executing treaty.160 As noted by Justice Thomas’s
concurrence and the dissent, the United States’ international reputa-
tion was seriously threatened by the potential to put a Mexican na-
tional to death161 in direct defiance of an ICJ ruling.162
The Court conceded that such an interest is compelling.163 How-
ever, the Court succinctly dismissed it as a determining factor in de-
ciding the balance of power between the two political branches in a
single, short sentence.164 The Court instead relied squarely on the
Jackson Concurrence to decide the issue. This curt rejection of func-
tionalism contrasts starkly with the Zivotofsky decision, which re-
quired a repeated functionalist buttress to support its shaky analysis
of the exclusivity of the Executive’s power at each step of its analysis.
The Dames & Moore decision dealt less directly with a functional-
ist versus formalist approach, but it is still instructive. A close reading
shows the Court did not intend to endorse a functionalist justification
for a large expansion of the Executive Branch’s power as found in the
156. Id. at 622 (majority opinion).
157. Id. at 567–68.
158. Id. at 624.
159. Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523–24 (2008).
160. Id. at 524.
161. José Medellı́n was in fact eventually executed for his crimes on August 5, 2008,
five months after the Court’s decision in Medellı́n to deny the application of the
ICJ ruling. Allan Turner & Rosanna Ruiz, Medellin Executed For Rape, Murder
of Houston Teens, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 5, 2008, http://www.chron.com/news/hous-
ton-texas/article/Medellin-executed-for-rape-murder-of-Houston-1770696.php
[https://perma.unl.edu/5B8Z-6ST7].
162. Medellı́n, 552 U.S. at 524.
163. Id.
164. Id. (“Such considerations, however, do not allow us to set aside first principles.”).
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Zivotofsky ruling. The most persuasive evidence for this reading of
Dames & Moore is the bookended structure of its analysis that explic-
itly states the ruling was intended to apply only to the case it was
deciding and was not creating a new rule to be applied in other situa-
tions.165 This is considerably different from the broad scope of the
Court’s announcement in Zivotofsky that the recognition power is ex-
clusively the domain of the Executive Branch.
The different categorization of the ruling in Dames & Moore also
plainly distinguishes it from the other previously discussed cases. The
Dames & Moore Court found Congress had explicitly approved the
first Executive Order, putting it in the first tier of the Jackson Concur-
rence.166 The second was supported by congressional intent and past
practice, putting it in the second tier.167 This is juxtaposed with
Youngstown, Hamdan, and Medellı́n, which the Court analyzed in the
third tier of the Jackson Concurrence, finding the Executive Branch
was encroaching on the Legislative Branch’s constitutional powers.
Zivotofsky is even further separated from Dames & Moore than
Youngstown, Hamdan, and Medellı́n because in Zivotofsky, Congress
explicitly acted in opposition to the Executive Branch’s actions by en-
acting Section 214(d).
It is clear from Youngstown, Hamdan, and Medellı́n the Court has
continuously refused broad expansions of Executive Branch powers on
the grounds of functionalist arguments in foreign-affairs separation-
of-powers cases. Because the Dames & Moore Court explicitly stated it
was not creating a broad executive power in the contested area, and
because the case did not fall into the third tier of the Jackson Concur-
rence, it is easily discernable from Zivotofsky. Therefore, it lends no
justification to the Court’s functionalist approach in Zivotofsky. In
short, the canon of foreign-affairs separation-of-powers cases is clearly
inconsistent with the functionalist foundation the Zivotofsky Court re-
lied on.
C. The Consequences of the Court’s Errors in Zivotofsky
The decision in Zivotofsky had two main consequences. The first is
a two-pronged increase in the Executive Branch’s power. The first,
most obvious increase in the Executive’s power was the addition of the
recognition power. Zivotofsky cemented the recognition power as ex-
clusively the province of the Executive Branch instead of the shared
165. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660–61 (1981) (“We attempt to lay down
no general ‘guidelines’ covering other situations not involved here, and attempt to
confine the opinion only to the very questions necessary to decision of the case.”).
166. Id. at 674.
167. Id. at 678.
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status it had in past practice.168 Chief Justice Roberts highlighted the
gravity of this transition in his dissent when he noted it was the first
time the Executive had ever been allowed to act in the face of explicit
congressional opposition in the area.169
The second increase in Executive Branch power is the Court’s ap-
plication of a lower standard to find an executive power is exclusive,
combined with the dependence on functionalist arguments to justify
that standard.170 Both make future Jackson Concurrence analysis
favor the Executive Branch in the third tier. The question is now to
what degree the “one voice” logic applied by the majority will become
the standard the Court uses to assess separation-of-powers cases in-
volving foreign affairs. Certainly the majority’s analysis regarding the
Executive’s ability to act decisively and engage in sensitive or covert
matters of state holds true in a myriad of situations in foreign affairs.
Similarly, the unitary nature of the Executive Branch will also almost
always make it a more practical or expedient operator to solve
problems.171 Given the number of enumerated powers the Legislative
Branch has in the field of foreign affairs, there is an untold amount of
power that may now be in reach of the Executive Branch if the Court
finds its own logic persuasive in other situations.
The second major consequence of the Zivotofsky decision was to
make the prediction of future foreign-affairs separation-of-powers de-
cisions impractical. Zivotofsky raises the question of what standard
will be used to assess whether a power is exclusive to the Executive
Branch within the third tier of the Jackson Concurrence going for-
ward. To find an exclusive executive power, will the Court apply the
loosened standard found in Zivotofsky? Or will it rely on the standard
it used in Youngstown, Hamdan, and Medellı́n? Will its choice of stan-
dard rely on the persuasiveness of functionalist arguments surround-
ing the power in question? The purpose of a functionalist justification
is to make the law more practical. Instead, Zivotofsky has ironically
made it less functional for future decisions by making it unclear ex-
actly what the law is in different circumstances the Court may face in
new cases.
The unpredictability of the Court in this area is particularly dis-
turbing given the hazardous situations the Court usually faces in
168. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2088–90 (2015) (“[U]ntil
today, the political branches have resolved their disputes over questions of
recognition.”).
169. Id. at 2113 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“Never before has this Court accepted a Pres-
ident’s direct defiance of an Act of Congress in the field of foreign affairs.”).
170. Cohen, supra note 129, at 395 (“[I]n the foreign affairs context, functionalism
favors the executive branch.”).
171. Id.
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these cases.172 In the five decisions the Court has ruled on in this
area, the backdrops have involved the Korean War, the possibility of
using nuclear weapons, and the collapse of diplomatic relations with
Iran, including the capture of hostages in the American consulate in
Tehran, the prosecution of terrorists during the “war on terror,” the
international credibility of the United States after the execution of a
convicted criminal in Texas in the face of an ICJ ruling, and a dispute
over U.S. foreign policy in Jerusalem—one of the most contentious is-
sues in international politics. Making it unclear how the Court will
assess the relationship of constitutionally founded foreign-affairs pow-
ers in future cases adds significant complexity to already-delicate sce-
narios. Such a convoluted outcome could have been avoided had the
Court relied on the approach it had previously used in Youngstown,
Dames & Moore, Hamdan, and Medellı́n.
IV. CONCLUSION
If history is any indication, the battle for control of the City of Jeru-
salem will continue on well into the future. Similarly, the tension be-
tween the President’s attempt to respond to the challenges presented
to the Executive Branch and the Constitution’s separation of powers is
likely to last as long as the Union itself. The Zivotofsky Court was
presented with a rare opportunity to wade into this area to settle a
dispute between the Executive and Legislative Branches in the third
tier of the Jackson Concurrence.
Unfortunately, the Court’s decision in Zivotofsky had two major in-
consistencies with its past decisions in Youngstown, Dames & Moore,
Hamdan, and Medellı́n. The first was the lower standard the Court
relied on to assess whether a power is exclusive to the Executive
Branch. The Court started with the power to receive ambassadors but
then perplexingly relied on the treaty power and the power to nomi-
nate and appoint ambassadors—two explicitly shared powers—to find
that the combination of the three gave the recognition power solely to
the Executive Branch. The second was the functionalist gap filling the
Court used to attempt to shore up its weakened standard for finding
the recognition power is exclusive—an approach it had explicitly re-
jected in the previous cases.
The combination of these errors made the application of the Jack-
son Concurrence in this area of law even murkier. It is now unclear
whether the Court will follow its approach from the previous cases or
the divergent path it chose in Zivotofsky. Thus, more than sixty years
172. Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalism for Foreign Affairs?, 53 ST. LOUIS L.J. 5, 20 (2008)
(“In the area of foreign affairs . . . the interpretations we give the Constitution
can implicate the survival of the Republic itself.” (quoting H. Jefferson Powell,
The Founders and the President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs, 40 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1999))).
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after Justice Jackson famously lamented the lack of “really useful and
unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of executive
power,”173 the Court’s most recent decision has only served to compli-
cate the issue even further.174
The Court’s analytical flaws in Zivotofsky also increased the Exec-
utive Branch’s power. The Court concluded the Executive held the rec-
ognition power exclusively for the first time. The lowered standard for
finding a power is exclusive to the Executive Branch, and the function-
alist approach adopted to reach that result, may also increase Execu-
tive Branch power significantly if it is applied in future cases. The
sum of these increases has moved the Executive Branch in the direc-
tion of the expansive executive power wielded by King George III, the
example both feared and rejected by Justice Jackson in his famous
Youngstown concurrence.175
173. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
174. For a discussion of the impact of the Court’s erratic approach to foreign affairs
cases in general, see Vladeck, supra note 15.
175. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 641 (Jackson, J., concurring).
